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Abstract 
 
The CJEU has no jurisdiction to rule in purely internal situations, save for three exceptions. 
As easy as this may sound, the CJEU’s case law is not entirely consistent and created 
uncertainty for national courts. This article critically examines how the CJEU has dealt with 
purely internal situations. It shows that the CJEU should be stricter in defending its gates. 
Instead of turning the three exceptions into the rule, the CJEU should treat the three 
exceptions as they were originally envisaged: Exceptions. The recent Grand Chamber in 
Ullens de Schooten is a step in the right direction. A stricter approach makes it necessary 
that the CJEU looks a bit more over the national judge’s shoulder, which changes the 
cooperative dynamic by putting the CJEU into a more vertical position vis-à-vis national 
courts. National courts can, however, escape this more conflictual setup by providing more 
detailed information as to the fulfillment of one of the three exceptions.  
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A. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, EU law only prohibits restrictions on free movements between Member States, 
and not within single Member States.1 Additionally, a mere theoretical possibility of a cross-
border situation is not enough for internal market freedoms to apply, as the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently recognized. The CJEU has thus declined to 
rule on purely internal situations where the facts of the case are confined to one Member 
State and where there are no cross-border elements that provide a link with EU law.2 The 
CJEU has, however, formulated three exceptions when it has jurisdiction to rule on such 
purely internal situations: When cross-border effects cannot be excluded (Oosthoek), when 
national law makes EU law applicable by way of a so-called renvoi in situations outside the 
scope of EU law (Dzodzi), and when national law prohibits reverse discrimination (Guimont).3 
The purely internal situation doctrine functions as a “gatekeeper” to the preliminary ruling 
procedure from a procedural point. This doctrine is not solely a technical procedural matter. 
It governs the scope of EU law and delimits the jurisdiction of the CJEU to rule on EU law 
from the competence of the national court to interpret and apply national law. In addition, 
the way in which the doctrine is applied also affects the workload of the CJEU and the 
functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure.4 If the CJEU’s jurisdiction is too broad, it 
might hamper the ability of the CJEU to deliver judgments expeditiously while 
simultaneously guaranteeing their quality.5 
 
                                            
1 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 28, 30, 34, 35, 49, 56 and 63, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326/47) 1; Pedro Caro de Soussa, Catch Me if you Can? The Market Freedoms’ Ever-Expanding Outer Limits, 4 
EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (2011). 
2 See Case 98/86, Ministère Public v. Mathot, 1987 E.C.R. 00809; Case 20/87, Ministère Public v. André Gauchard, 
1987 E.C.R. 04879; Case C-134/95, USSL nº 47 di Biella v INAIL, 1997 E.C.R. I-195; Case C-108/98, RI.SAN., 1999 
E.C.R. I-5219, paras. 18–23; Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Württemburg 1984 E.C.R. 02539, para. 18; 
Case C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 1997 E.C.R. I-02629, para. 16; Case 
C-97/98, Jägerskiöld, 1999 ECR I-7319, para. 42. 
3 Note that the CJEU seems to suggest that there is a fourth category when national law applies to and has effects 
on nationals of other Member States. See Joined Cases ECJ, C-197/11 and C-203/11, Libert, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288, 
Judgment of 8 May 2013. See also ECJ, Case C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 51, Judgment 
of 15 November 2016; Case 286/81, Oosthoek, 1982 E.C.R. 4575; and Joined Cases 297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 
1990 E.C.R. I-3763; Case C-448/98, Guimont, 2000 E.C.R. I-10663. 
4See Jurian Langer, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure: Old Problems or New Challenges? (Dec. 29, 2016), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885256; Maria Dicosola, Christina Fasone, and Irene 
Spigno, Foreword: Constitutional Courts in the European Legal System After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis, 
16 GERMAN L. J. 1326 (2015). 
5See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl at para. 3, Case C-497/12, Gullotta and Farmacia di Gullotta Davide & C. 
(July 2, 2015), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/.  
2017 The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling 1361 
             
The three exceptions have been there for quite some time, but it seems that the CJEU has 
easily found applicable exceptions in some recent cases and has been particularly eager to 
stretch the exceptions to accept jurisdiction, especially in the Oosthoek line of cases.6 It 
seems that the CJEU has incorporated the three exceptions into the rule.7 In other words, 
the CJEU is not guarding its gates very carefully. With respect to the other two exceptions 
(Dzodzi and Guimont), the CJEU has not so much broadened their use, but has simply 
continued its accommodating approach in the great majority of cases, despite heavy 
criticism from Advocates General (AGs) and academics in the 1990s and early 2000s.8 The 
CJEU, for example, still establishes its jurisdiction by simply assuming that national courts 
are obliged to also accept the CJEU interpretation in renvoi cases where national law 
conforms to EU law in situations falling outside the scope of EU law.9 Nonetheless, the CJEU’s 
approach has not been entirely consistent especially in recent cases where the CJEU guards 
the gates more carefully. In these cases, the CJEU is stricter in determining whether it could 
answer preliminary rulings.10 The seemingly inconsistent approach of the CJEU could be 
especially problematic for national courts dealing with possible purely internal situations 
and who wonder whether these have a sufficient link with EU law.11  
 
Given the importance of the purely internal situation doctrine as well as the uncertainty for 
national courts, it is surprising that this issue has not received much academic attention, at 
least in journals in the English language.12 It is thus essential to give an overview of how the 
CJEU has dealt with the three exceptions to the general rule even though it has no 
jurisdiction to rule on purely internal situations. In addition, this Article assesses the CJEU’s 
recent case law critically in the light of the academic literature and Opinions of Advocates 
General. In doing so, this article asks the CJEU for clearer guidance, especially with a view to 
addressing the uncertainty for national courts in this regard. Before the three exceptions are 
examined separately in sections D through F, a broader framework will be sketched as to the 
                                            
6 See Tribuno Supremo, Case C-168/14, Grupo Itevelesa and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:685, para. 36, Judgment of 3 
June 2015; ECJ, Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber and Harmsen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:641, para. 41, Judgment 
of 1 October 2015; Klaas Sevinga, Bevoegdheid van het Hof van Justitie: de ene interne situatie is de andere niet , 
NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES RECHT (2014). 
7 See Case C-203/09, Volvo Car Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-10721, paras. 23–31. 
8See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-28/95 and Case C-130/95, Leur Bloem/Giloy (Sept. 17, 1996), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
9 See ECJ, Case C-345/14, Maxima Latvija, ECLI:EU:C:2015:784, Judgment of 26 November 2015. 
10 See ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 48, Judgment of 
13 Feb. 2014; ECJ, Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, ECLI:EU:C:2013:791, paras. 25–26, Judgment of 5 
December 2013; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 5, at para. 37. 
11 See infra notes 110–114. 
12 But see Sevinga, supra note 6; Sacha Prechal, Interne situatie en prejudiciële vragen, SEW (2015) 
https://www.ris.uu.nl/ws/files/17853881/19.pdf. 
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relationship between the CJEU and national courts in section B, as well as the conceptual 
difference between the jurisdiction of the CJEU and the (in)admissibility of the questions 
posed by national courts in section C. 
 
B. The Broader Context: The Relationship Between the CJEU and National Courts 
 
The broader and underlying theme of this article about a seemingly technical issue is the 
relationship between the CJEU and national courts in the context of the preliminary 
reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). This procedure is the “keystone” of the EU legal system and the power of 
national courts to make a reference “constitutes the very essence of the [Union] system of 
judicial protection.”13 It is the “jewel in the crown” of the CJEU and the “most fundamental 
element in the constitutional architecture of the [EU] legal order.”14 The CJEU has 
contributed significantly to shaping and transforming EU law and the constitutionalization 
of the EU on the basis of Article 267’s procedure and the willingness of courts to make use 
of it.15 The rest of this Section will theorize the relationship between the CJEU and national 
courts. 
 
The CJEU has consistently held that there is “clear separation of functions between the 
national courts and the Court.”16 The CJEU interprets EU law, while the national courts apply 
this interpretation to the facts of the case. This distinction between application and 
interpretation is also relevant when deciding to refer. The CJEU clearly connects the 
assessment of the facts by national courts to the courts’ decision to refer “in the light of the 
particular circumstances of the case.”17 The CJEU has emphasized consistently since 
Costa/ENEL that it is not for the CJEU to question the reasons for submitting a question.18 It 
has emphasized that national courts have the “widest discretion” to decide the necessity 
                                            
13 See ECJ, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para. 176, Judgment of 18 December 2014; Case C-300/99 P, Area Cova 
and others v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-983, para. 54.  
14 See Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts Reconsidered, 36 TEX. INT’L L. J. 556, 559 (2001); J.H.H. 
Weiler, The European Court, National Courts and References for Preliminary Rulings—The Paradox of Success: A 
Revisionist View of Article 177 EEC, ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS (Henry G. Schermers, C.W.A. 
Timmermans & A.E. Kellerman, eds. 1987).  
15 See generally Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. 
POL. STUD. (1994).  
16 See ECJ, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 15, Judgment of 16 June 2015. 
17 See id. 
18 See id.; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1195.  
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and relevance of their questions.19 The CJEU is “in principle bound to give a ruling” on 
questions about the interpretation of EU law because they enjoy “a presumption of 
relevance.”20 Note that this dichotomy between interpretation and application has been 
criticized on the grounds that one cannot only interpret the law in abstract without any 
regard to the facts.21 It is therefore not surprising that the CJEU has in practice not stuck 
closely to this dichotomy and has in some judgments discussed the direction of application, 
without explicitly admitting so.22 
  
This separation of functions could be put in a broader perspective as well, focused more on 
the nature of the relationship between the CJEU and national courts. There are conflicting 
views on this theme. On the one hand, there are those who argue that this relationship is 
based, primarily, on cooperation. This is also how the CJEU seems to portray the preliminary 
reference procedure in its judgments. It has held numerous times that “Article 267 TFEU is 
an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts.”23 
Scholars who take a “constitutional pluralist” perspective primarily accentuate dynamics of 
cooperation and construe the relationship as horizontal and heterarchical. This “theory” 
posits, among others, that national constitutions are the supreme source of EU law, that 
there is no hierarchical relationship, and that both national courts, as well as the CJEU, each 
claim final authority.24 The theory primarily emphasizes the fact that the CJEU depends 
entirely on the national courts for their willingness to submit questions forcing the CJEU to 
be “humble and thankful” for the referring courts’ engagement with it.25 National courts are 
thus essentially the gatekeepers of the procedure.26 The fact that many constitutional courts 
                                            
19 Case 146/73, Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1974 E.C.R. 
139. 
20See Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07, Blanco Pérez, 2010 E.C.R. I-4629, paras. 35–36; C-280/06, ETI, 2007 
E.C.R. I-10893, para. 20; Case C-300/01, Salzmann, 2003 E.C.R. I-4899, para. 31. 
21See Daniel Sarmiento, The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves. Constitutional Pluralism, Preliminary References and 
the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EU AND BEYOND 309 (M. Avbelj & J. Komárek 
eds., 2012). 
22See ECJ, Case C-614/14, Ognyanov, ECLI:EU:C:2016:514, Judgment of 5 July 2016; Case C-137/09, Josemans, 2010 
E.C.R. I-13019. 
23See ECJ, Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:630, para. 18, Judgment of 6 September 2016. 
24See Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary 
Ruling, 16 GERMAN L.J. 1795 (2015). 
25See Sarmiento, supra note 21, at 291. 
26See Takis Tridimas, The ECJ and the National Courts. Dialogue, Cooperation, and Instability, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 407 (Anthony Arnull & Damian Chalmers eds. 2015). 
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have been reluctant to turn to the CJEU for help fits well within this model.27 The CILFIT 
exceptions to the obligation of the highest courts to refer under Article 267(3) TFEU can also 
be interpreted as widening the autonomy of national courts.28 Likewise, the use of open 
norms, such as proportionality, or “silent” judgments in which the CJEU avoids giving a full 
answer also confer discretion on national courts and supports a vision of cooperating 
courts.29 In addition, the CJEU does not possess a coercive monitoring mechanism 
guaranteeing compliance with its ruling leaving the final say to the referring court.30 
 
On the other hand, there are those who approach the relationship primarily from the 
perspective of a hierarchy and opine that Article 267 is not a purely non-committal vehicle.31 
They point to the binding force of the judgments of the CJEU.32 The CJEU’s judgment in 
Köbler illustrates the hierarchical dimensions. In this judgment, the CJEU determined that 
Member States are also liable for infringements of EU law by national courts of the last 
instance.33 The CJEU made clear that the Austrian court was not entitled to withdraw its 
request for a preliminary ruling because the CILFIT requirements had not been fulfilled.34 
With Köbler, the CJEU placed itself at the top of the judicial hierarchy. This could also be 
deduced from its definition of “sufficiently serious breach” including a “manifest breach of 
the case law of the Court in the matter.”35 The CJEU reaffirmed Köbler more recently in 
Ferreira da Silva and suggested that the refusal of the Portuguese court to refer could 
constitute a breach of Article 267 TFEU and give rise to liability.36 
                                            
27 Giuseppe Martinico, Judging in the Multilevel Legal Order: Exploring the Techniques of “Hidden Dialogue,” 21 
KING’S L.J. 257 (2010); Monica Claes, Luxembourg, Here We Come? Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure, 16 GERMAN L.J. 1331 (2015). 
28See Sarmiento, supra note 21, at 313. 
29See Gareth Davies, Activism Relocated. The Self-Restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context, 
19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 76 (2012). 
30See Sarmiento, supra note 21, at 309. 
31See generally Christiaan Timmermans, The Magic World of Constitutional Pluralism, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. (2014). 
32For a clear statement of the ECJ in this direction, see ECJ, Case C-62/14 Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, at para. 16.  
33See Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Republik Österreich, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239. This judgment was later confirmed in Case 
C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Repubblica italiana, 2006 E.C.R. I-5177. The CJEU also determined that 
Italian legislation limiting state liability for damage caused by courts of last instance breached EU law. See Case C-
379/10, Commission v. Italy 2011 E.C.R. I-180. 
34See Köbler, Case C-224/01 at paras. 117–18. 
35See id. at para. 56; Thomas de la Mare & Catherine Donnelly, Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: 
Evolution and Stasis, THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 377 (Paul Craig & Grainne De Búrca eds. 2015). 
36 The CJEU held that “in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings,” the Portuguese court 
was obligated to refer. The Portuguese court was wrong to consider the answer to be clair because of the conflicting 
decisions of lower courts regarding the interpretation of the concept of a “transfer of a business” and the fact that 
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This short overview shows that there are contrasting claims. It is not the purpose of this 
Article to discuss the merits of the conflicting viewpoint, although it seems reasonable to 
conclude that both cooperative, as well as hierarchical elements, exist together in the case 
law of the CJEU.37 De la Mare and Donnelly also argued that the CJEU has continued with its 
cooperation discourse with the idea of “sweetening the bitter pill of the CJEU’s own 
repositioning” in Köbler.38 The overview also raises the question how these two different 
approaches relate to the issue of the purely internal situation. A lenient approach on the 
side of the CJEU where it easily applies one of the three exceptions and/or whereby it simply 
relies on, and does not question, the assessment of the national courts fits best with the 
cooperational model presenting national courts as gatekeepers. By contrast, a more 
restrictive approach where the CJEU more critically examines the request of national courts 
turns the dialogue into a hierarchical relation, because the CJEU is “second guessing” and 
thus judging the preparatory work of national courts. It also means that the CJEU is “looking 
over the shoulder of the national judge.”39 This more detailed and careful assessment on the 
part of the CJEU requires it to grapple with questions about national laws and examine the 
factual situation.40 When the CJEU pursues the latter approach and declines all too easily 
questions by national courts potentially upsets the spirit of cooperation and decrease the 
trust of national courts and their willingness to engage with the CJEU.41  
 
It is a rather delicate task for the CJEU to find a right balance between these considerations. 
Finding a right and clear balance is extremely relevant, as sketched already in the 
introduction. First, the preliminary ruling procedure only works effectively if the “rules of 
the game” are unequivocal and understood by the CJEU and national courts.42 As will be 
                                            
that concept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in various Member States. See ECJ, Case C-160/14, 
Ferreira da Silva v. Estados portugu ês, ECLI:EU:C:2015:565, paras. 44–45, Judgment of 9 September 2015. 
37See Tridimas, supra note 26, at 407. 
38See de la Mare and Donnelly, supra note 35, at 377. 
39 Catherine Barnard & Eleanor Sharpston, The Changing Face of Article 177 References, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
(1997). The tendency in the CJEU case law after Foglia to decline jurisdiction was also heavily criticized as being 
“disturbing and perplexing.” Salius LukasKaleda, Extension of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure Outside the Scope of 
Community Law: “The Dzodzi Line of Cases,” 4 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 6 (2000); Giuseppe Tesauro, The 
European Court and National Courts, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 12 (1993); Anthony Arnull, The Evolution of the Court’s 
Jurisdiction Under Article 177 EEC, 18 EUR. L. REV. (1993); David O’Keeffe, Is the Spirit of Article 177 Under Attack? 
Preliminary References and Admissibility, 23 EUR. L. REV. 509 (1998).  
40See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs at para. 57, Case C-306/99, BIAO, 2003 E.C.R. I-1, (Jan. 7, 2003), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
41See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen at para. 35, Case C-393/08, Sbarigia v. Azienda USL RM/A, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-6337 (July 1, 2010), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
42See Barnard & Sharpston, supra note 39, at 1168. 
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further substantiated below, the current uncertainty with respect to the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU in relation to purely internal situations is especially problematic for national courts. 
Second, balance is also warranted from the perspective of the workload of the CJEU. Several 
authors note that the system of the reference procedure is under pressure and a “victim of 
its own success” because of the exponential increase in cases, especially since the mid-
2000s.43 So far, the CJEU managed to cope with the growing caseload and even reduced the 
average duration of the procedure, but according to some to the detriment of the quality of 
argumentation in CJEU judgments.44 It is expected that the CJEU is confronted with more 
referred cases because of the enlarged automatic jurisdiction of the CJEU after December 1, 
2014 in the field of police and judicial cooperation, including areas such as migration and 
criminal law. The delay caused by a preliminary ruling is also a factor influencing the national 
courts’ willingness to refer.45 A too lenient approach of the CJEU in accepting cases, leading 
to more cases and a bigger delay, could further deter courts from referring questions when 
a preliminary ruling would be especially warranted. 
 
C. Jurisdiction and Admissibility: What’s in the Name? 
 
When the CJEU is confronted with a purely internal situation which lacks any connection 
with the free movement provisions, the CJEU generally declines to answer the question. The 
rationale is that because the Treaty provisions do not apply in such situations, an answer 
from the CJEU is not relevant to solve the dispute.46 In these cases, the CJEU employs several 
approaches to refrain from answering. The CJEU can declare that it does not have jurisdiction 
to deal with the matter.47 It can declare the questions inadmissible.48 It can also simply hold 
that it is not necessary to answer the question or that EU law is inapplicable.49  
 
                                            
43See de la Mare and Donelly, supra note 35; Diana-Urania Galetta, European Court of Justice and Preliminary 
Reference Procedure Today: National Judges, Please Behave!, VERFASSUNG UND VERWALTUNG IN EUROPA. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
JÜRGEN SCHWARZE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 674–91 (U. Becker et al. eds., 2014). 
44See Eleanor Sharpston, Making the Court of Justice of the European Union More Productive, MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. 
AND COMP. L. (2014); Jan Komarek, In the Court(s) We Trust? On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in the 
Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 32 EUR. L. REV. 482–83 (2007). 
45See Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Case 14/01680, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3608, Judgment of 22 December 2015. 
46 Prechal, supra note 12, at 494. 
47 ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 49–50, Judgment of 
13 Feb. 2014. 
48 See id. at paras. 39–40. 
49See Prechal, supra note 12, at 494. 
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These different routes and the concepts of (non)jurisdiction and (in)admissibility are used 
interchangeably by the CJEU even though they are different.50 Jurisdiction is governed by 
the principle of conferral and acts as a limit to the CJEU’s competence.51 Based on Article 
267 of the TFEU, the CJEU has the authority to give answers to questions about EU law which 
are posed by a national “court or tribunal of a Member State” in an area of law over which 
it has competence. This means that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the 
Treaties, the validity and interpretation of national law or international law. Only when the 
CJEU has jurisdiction can it analyze the admissibility of the questions. Admissibility relates to 
the question as to whether the order for reference fulfills the procedural requirements or 
admissibility criteria and includes the sufficiency of information provided by referring court. 
Inadmissibility can subsequently be corrected by the referring national court in a new 
request for a preliminary ruling which repairs the previous “error of procedure.”52 
Alternatively, the CJEU can request the national court to provide clarification based on 
Article 101 of the Rules of Procedure. These two options are not possible when the CJEU 
lacks jurisdiction.53 
 
It seems more logical that the CJEU deals with possibly purely internal situations in the 
context of the (in)admissibility of the questions rather than in relation to its jurisdiction.54 
This is because the forthcoming analysis illustrates that the CJEU has in principle accepted 
jurisdiction to deal with purely internal situations in three different types of cases. Only 
when it is beyond doubt that the exceptions are not applicable and that the situation is not 
governed by EU law, would it seem logical for the CJEU to declare that it has no jurisdiction.55 
Examining the presence of a sufficient cross-border element as an admissibility issue would 
also imply that this assessment is conducted at an early stage as a procedural matter instead 
of in the context of the substantive consideration of the questions. The CJEU did so in 
                                            
50 Ramona Grimbergen, How Boundaries Have Shifted. On Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Preliminary Ruling 
Procedure, 8 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 40 (2015); Case C-245/09, Omalet, 2010 E.C.R. I-13771, paras. 18–19; Opinion of 
Advocate General Wahl, at para. 44, Case C-207/13, Wagenborg Passagiersdiensten BV, (May 13, 2014), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 5, at para. 15; Opinion 
of Advocate General Jääskinen at paras. 29-38, Case C-393/08, Sbarigia v. Azienda USL RM/A, 2010 E.C.R. I-6337 
(July 1, 2010). 
51Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 5, at paras. 16, 21; ECJ, Case C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 40, Judgment of 15 November 2016. 
52 See id. at para. 21; ECJ, C-281/15, Sahyouni, ECLI:EU:C:2016:343, para. 32, Judgment of 12 May 2016. 
53 Grimbergen, supra note 50, at 41. 
54 Prechal, supra note 12, at 495. 
55 This also seems to be the approach of the CJEU in Ullens de Schooten, even though the CJEU places more emphasis 
on the fact that it has jurisdiction in relation to the principle of non-contractual liability. ECJ, Case C-268/15, Ullens 
de Schooten, ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 41–44, Judgment of 15 November 2016; See also ECJ, Joined Cases C-
162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 49–50, Judgment of 13 Feb. 2014. 
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Berlington where the CJEU accepted jurisdiction after determining that several customers to 
the Hungarian amusement arcades were EU citizens holidaying in Hungary and that it was 
far from inconceivable that operators from other Member States would be interested in 
opening a casino.56 In other cases, such as Trijber, the CJEU nonetheless examined the 
connection with EU law and the cross border elements at a later stage in the context of the 
substantive consideration of the questions.57  
 
The rest of the article will not expand on the (conceptual) difference between the notions 
of jurisdiction and admissibility, but focuses more on the way in which the CJEU has applied 
those notions to the purely internal situation doctrine.   
 
D. The Oosthoek Exception: Cross-border Effects Cannot be Excluded 
 
I. The Recent Oosthoek Case Law of the CJEU 
 
One exception to the general rule that the CJEU has no jurisdiction to hear purely internal 
situations are cases in which a cross-border effect cannot be excluded. In its case law starting 
from Oosthoek, the CJEU has answered questions in such situations on the basis that it is not 
unthinkable that nationals of other Member States may, in similar situations, be faced with 
the contested national measures adopted by the Member State.58 The classical judgment in 
this respect is the free movement of goods case of Smanor which dealt with a French 
company selling deep-frozen yogurt on the French market that contested the French 
consumer protection law which restricted the use of “yogurt” to fresh yogurt only. The facts 
in this case were thus confined to one single Member State. The CJEU replied to the question 
of the French court and examined the French law without excluding the possibility that such 
products may be imported from other Member States. The CJEU did note that its ruling 
should not be applied in relation to Smanor in the national court proceedings.59 In addition 
                                            
56See ECJ, Case C-98/14, Berlington, ECLI:EU:C:2015:386, para. 23–28, Judgment of 11 June 2015; see also Tribuno 
Supremo, Case C-168/14, Grupo Itevelesa and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:685, para. 36, Judgment of 3 June 2015; Case 
C-384/08, Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano, 2010 E.C.R. I-2055, para. 24. 
57See ECJ, Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber and Harmsen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:641, para. 41, Judgment of 1 
October 2015. See also ECJ, C-292/12, Ragn-Sells AS v. Sillamäe Linnavalitsus, ECLI:EU:C:2013:820, paras. 69-74, 
Judgment of 12 December 2013. 
58 In Oosthoek, the CJEU applied Article 34 TFEU in relation to both domestic and imported products. See Case 
286/81, Oosthoek, 1982 E.C.R. 4575 
59See Case 298/87, Smanor, 1988 E.C.R. 4489, paras. 8-10 (referring to what the court did following the CJEU 
judgment in Smanor and the “curious situation” to which AG Jacobs referred). See also Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 63; Cyril Ritter, Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi 
and Article 234, 12, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=95424; Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons 
and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 731 (2002).  
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to the free movement of goods,60 the CJEU has issued comparable judgments in relation to 
the other free movement provisions, capital,61 services,62 and establishment.63  The rest of 
this section focuses on the recent free movement case law of the CJEU, except for citizenship 
cases.64 Competition law cases will also be left aside.65 
 
In Attanasio Group, the Third Chamber of the CJEU66 used—the now-often used 
expression—“it is far from inconceivable” that nationals from other Member States have 
been or are interested in establishing themselves, for the first time.67 In this case, an Italian 
company was denied a permit to construct a service station selling fuel, because another 
company was granted a permit a short distance from the site envisaged by Attanasio. The 
                                            
60 See also Joined Cases C-363/93, C-407/93, C-408/93, C-409/93, C-410/93 and C-411/93, Lancry v. Direction 
Générale des Souanes et. al., 1994 E.C.R. I-3957; Case C-293/02, Jersey Produce Marketing Organization v. Jersey 
Potato Export Marketing Board, 2005 E.C.R. I-9543; Case C-72/03, Carbonati Apuani v. Comune di Carrara, 2004 
E.C.R. I-8027. 
61See Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch v. Bürgermeister der 
Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, et. al., 2002, E.C.R. I-2157.  
62See Case C-6/01, Anomar v. Estado português, 2003 E.C.R. I-8621. 
63See Case C-250/03, Mauri v. Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato presso la Corte 
d'appello di Milano, 2005 E.C.R. I-1267. 
64 One could especially point to the case law of the CJEU on EU citizenship in this context, Zambrano in particular. 
See Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-1177. See ECJ, Case C-
304/14, Secretary of State for the Home Division v. CS, ECLI:EU:C:2016:674, Judgment of 13 September 2016; ECJ, 
Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín v. Administración del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, Judgment of 13 September 2016. 
See also Dimitry Kochenov, The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification, 19 Eur. L. J. 
(2013); Nic Shuibhne, supra note 59, at 740. 
65 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU prohibit anti-competitive practices “which may affect trade between Member States.” 
The CJEU adopted a broad definition by determining “it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States.” An actual impact 
on trade is not required, but the disputed practice must only be capable of having such an effect. Nor does it matter 
that all facts are confined to one Member State only. See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau 
Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235; Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1025 (2015); Kamiel 
Mortelmans, Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on Competition, 38 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 613 (2001). 
66 Note that in Centro Europa 7 the CJEU also answered the questions on whether it is possible that operators in 
other Member States would be interested. See Case C-380/05, Centro Europa 7 v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni e 
Autorità, 2008 E.C.R. I-349, para. 66. 
67 The CJEU seems to have taken this “far from inconceivable”  logic from procurement cases where this has been 
used by the CJEU in relation to the tendering of public service concessions. Centro Europa 7, for example, referred 
to two judgments in the field of public procurement for support. See id. at para. 66; Case 
C-87/94, Commission v. Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-2043, para. 33; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen v. Gemeinde Brixen, 
2005 E.C.R. I-8585, para. 55. See also Case C-231/03, Coname v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti, 2005 E.C.R. I-7287, 
paras. 17-18.  
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refusal stemmed from Italian regulations providing for mandatory minimum distances 
between such stations.68 In a subsequent case, Blanco Pérez, the Grand Chamber also 
subscribed to this logic.69 That case was about two Spanish pharmacists challenging Spanish 
rules which limited the opening of new pharmacies in Asturias even though they had not 
made use of the Treaty freedoms. The CJEU held that it cannot exclude foreigners who also 
want to run a pharmacy in Asturias. The eagerness of the CJEU to examine the Spanish 
measure also seems to stem from the fact that the measure was indirectly discriminatory 
because the selection process for new pharmacies favored pharmacists who had pursued 
their professional activities in the region of Asturias.70 This judgment illustrates that the CJEU 
tends to focus on the nature and substance of the national measure which is “capable of 
producing effects which are not confined to that Member State” rather than the facts of the 
case.71 In other words, while the factual elements are restricted to one individual Member 
State, the relevant legal elements are not.72 The judgment also exemplifies that the CJEU 
seems eager to answer requests with the idea to “seize the moment,” because it remains 
uncertain whether another court will refer a similar case, which has cross-border elements, 
in the future.73 
 
The “far from inconceivable” phrase has since been repeated in other cases in a mantra-like 
way, sometimes in a slightly different wording (e.g. “it is by no means inconceivable that”74 
or “it is conceivable”).75 One example includes Libert, which dealt with Flemish legislation 
that made the transfer of immovable property in certain communes dependent upon a 
sufficient connection between the potential buyer and the communes. The CJEU again 
simply stipulated that it is by no means inconceivable that natural or legal persons in other 
                                            
68 The CJEU eventually held that the rules are more advantageous to operators already established in Italy and, 
hence, discourage or even preclude access to operators from other Member States. See Attanasio Group Srl v 
Comune di Carbognano, Case C-384/08 at para. 24. 
69 Blanco Pérez, Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 at para. 40. 
70 See id. at paras. 117–22. According to AG Wahl, the potential restrictive effects were evident in Venturini. See 
Opinion of Advocate General Wahl at para. 67, Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini v. ASL Varese et. al., 
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
71 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed at para. 88, Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 
to C-540/99, Reisch v. Grundverkehrsbeauftragter des Landes Salzburg and Grundverkehrslandeskommission des 
Landes Salzburg, 2002, E.C.R. I-2157 (Nov. 20, 2001), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/; Caro de Soussa, 
supra note 1, at 169–73. 
72See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 5, at para. 34. 
73See Ritter, supra note 59, at 12. 
74 See Joined Cases ECJ, C-197/11 and C-203/11, Libert, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288, para. 34, Judgment of 8 May 2013. 
75 ECJ, Case C-265/12, Citroën Belux, ECLI:EU:C:2013:498, para. 33, Judgment of 18 July 2013, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
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Member States were or are interested.76 In Venturini, three Italian owners of para-
pharmacies requested an authorization to sell medicinal products and proprietary drugs for 
veterinary use for which a prescription is required but the cost of which is wholly borne by 
the customer. Their request was rejected based on Italian law and because those products 
could only be sold in pharmacies. Venturini itself accepted that there was no actual cross-
border element, but the CJEU noted that the legislation potentially had restrictive effects on 
the possibility for operators based in other Member States to become established in Italy 
because “it is far from inconceivable” that nationals in other Member States had or have an 
interest in operating pharmacies.77 In addition, in Trijber, the CJEU held that one cannot 
speak of purely internal situations when there is a probability that services may be enjoyed 
by nationals of other Member States and service providers from other Member States may 
wish to establish themselves in the Netherlands.78 Despite the fact that in this case both the 
service provider and the recipients were Dutch, this situation—without much discussion and 
against the Opinion of AG Szpunar—fell within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and the Services Directive.79 
 
There are several recent cases in which the CJEU applied a stricter approach and did not 
answer the referred questions.80 Those cases illustrate that the CJEU, contrary to the 
previous judgments, clearly expects national courts to substantiate their findings that 
economic operators in other Member States were affected or interested in pursuing an 
economic activity.81 In Ragn-Sells, the CJEU was confronted with a company that contested 
                                            
76See Joined Cases ECJ, C-197/11 and C-203/11, Libert, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288, para. 34, Judgment of 8 May 2013.  
77See ECJ, Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, ECLI:EU:C:2013:791, paras. 25-26, Judgment of 5 
December 2013. In a subsequent and rather similar case about para-pharmacies, Gullotta, the CJEU declared the 
questions inadmissible because the national court failed to explain why the national legislation does not comply 
with the EU Treaties, and consequently the CJEU could not give a useful answer. See ECJ, Case C-497/12, Gullotta 
and Farmacia di Gullotta Davide & C. v. Ministero della Salute, ECLI:EU:C:2015:436, Judgment of 2 July 2015.  
78See ECJ, Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber and Harmsen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:641, para. 41, Judgment of 1 
October 2015. 
79 The CJEU thus avoided, contrary to the opinion of AG Szpunar, ruling on the much-debated question as to whether 
the Directive 2006/123 applies to such purely internal situations. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar at paras. 
48-49, Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber and Harmsen (July 16, 2015), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. See also Catherine Barnard, Unravelling the Services Directive, 45 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 323, 351–52 (2008); Gareth Davies, The Services Directive: Extending the Country of Origin 
Principle, and Reforming Public Administration, 32 EUR. L. REV. 232, 241–43 (2007). The Dutch Council of State was 
seemingly dissatisfied with the CJEU dodging of its question and referred the same question in Case C-31/16, Visser 
Vastgoed.  
80See ECJ, Case C-282/15, Queisser Pharma, ECLI:EU:C:2017:26, paras. 38-43, Judgment of 19 January 2017. 
81 AG Kokott noted in relation to Duomo Gpa that the CJEU did not accept the “general, unsupported and not further 
substantiated statement” that nationals of other MS might potentially have an interest. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott at para. 32, Joined cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, (Feb. 13, 2014), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. In Duomo Gpa, the CJEU based itself on the written submissions of the 
Commission to conclude that it is “far from inconceivable” that there is such an interest.  See ECJ, Joined Cases C-
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the awarding of a service concession for the collection and transport of waste produced in 
the Estonian Municipality of Sillamäe. In this case the CJEU held that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 
do not apply to this situation, because there was nothing in the case file suggesting that 
undertakings in other Member States were interested in treating waste in Sillamäe.82 While 
the CJEU did not require an actual interest in the previous cases and found a mere probability 
sufficient, the CJEU was more strict in Ragn-Sells.83 In Sbarigia, the CJEU declared the request 
inadmissible, because the questions were not relevant for the outcome of the dispute. This 
case involved an owner of a pharmacy located in the touristy historical center of Rome which 
had applied for an exemption from the obligatory holiday closure period because of the 
considerable increase in the number of consumers in this period.84 The CJEU considered it 
unclear how a decision on exempting a pharmacy from the opening hours might affect 
economic operators in other Member States.85 In addition, what also seemed to matter in 
Sbarigia, and what makes this case different from the previous ones, is that the applicant 
did not call into question the general system of rules on opening times and holidays for 
pharmacies, but only tried to obtain an exemption from that system.86  
 
Two other cases worthy of closer inspection are Airport Shuttle Service and Crono Service. 
Airport Shuttle Express concerned a dispute about the suspension of the authorization to 
operate a car and driver-for-hire service because the operator used garages in the territory 
of another municipality. This ran counter to the Italian law which provided that it is 
compulsory to exclusively use a garage situated in the territory of the municipality which 
issued the authorization for the service in question and that the service must begin and end 
at that garage. The CJEU held that it does not have jurisdiction, because it was not clear how 
this law affects economic operators from other Member States.87 This Italian law was also 
contested in Crono Service. The CJEU again held in similar terms that it cannot be presumed 
that the law has any cross-border impact. It subsequently pointed out that the national court 
                                            
357/10 to C-359/10, Duomo Gpa v. Comune di Baranzate, ECLI:EU:C:2012:283, para. 28, Judgment of 10 May 2012; 
see also ECJ, Joined Cases C-692/15 to C-694/15, Security Service v. Ministero dell'Interno, ECLI:EU:C:2016:344, 
paras. 23–25, Judgment of 12 May 2016. 
82See ECJ, Case C-292/12, Ragn-Sells AS v. Sillamäe Linnavalitsus, ECLI:EU:C:2013:820, para. 72, Judgment of 12 
December 2013. 
83 The Dutch referring court in Trijber also pointed to the seemingly stricter approach of the CJEU in Ragn-Sells. See 
ECJ, Dutch Council of State, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:2488, para. 4.10, Judgment of 9 July 2014. 
84 See Case C-393/08, Sbarigia, 2010 E.C.R. I-6337. 
85 The CJEU mentioned this in a subsequent case, Venturini, when it compared both cases. See ECJ, Joined Cases C-
159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, ECLI:EU:C:2013:791, paras. 27, Judgment of 5 December 2013. 
86See Case C-393/08, Sbarigia, 2010 E.C.R. I-6337, para. 24. 
87See ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 48, Judgment of 
13 Feb. 2014. 
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had failed in its orders for reference to establish any cross-border interest and did not 
explain why the Italian rules could hinder foreign operators.88 The CJEU subsequently 
declared that it did not have jurisdiction to answer the questions.89 In both Airport Shuttle 
Service and Crono Service, the CJEU used an additional notion in order to determine whether 
an answer is useful, which echoes the third exception relating to the prohibition of reversed 
discrimination—see section F. The CJEU held that a question is useful “if its national law 
were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of 
another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation.” In these two cases, 
the CJEU denied such usefulness by only referring to foreign companies “in the same 
situation as the applicants,” i.e. companies that are “already . . . pursuing an economic 
activity on a stable and continuous basis from an establishment located in Italy.” By applying 
this fiction, the CJEU was able to conclude that foreign companies are not affected, also 
because there was nothing to indicate how economic operators from other Member 
States might be affected.90 These judgments are thus indicative of a stricter approach of the 
CJEU, because it could also be argued, in the same way as in the cases previously discussed, 
that it is not far from inconceivable that nationals of other Member States might be affected 
by the Italian law, which is capable of producing effects beyond Italy, especially in the border 
region.91 In pursuing the latter route, the CJEU would also take the contested national 
measure as the departure point as it has done in the cases discussed earlier. The approach 
of the CJEU in the two stricter Italian cases, which has not been applied afterwards by the 
CJEU, primarily takes the factual situation as the starting point.  
 
In other cases, the CJEU has left the question of its jurisdiction and/or the admissibility of 
the questions in the middle. In its Grand Chamber judgment in Rina, the CJEU examined an 
Italian law requiring the registered offices of companies classified as certification bodies to 
be situated within the territory of the Italian Republic. It did so without paying any attention 
to the question of admissibility or jurisdiction of the questions, even though Attorney 
General (AG) Cruz Villalón held that there is “a somewhat hypothetical element,” because 
                                            
88See ECJ, Joined Cases C-419/12 and C-420/12, Crono Service v. Roma Capitale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:81, para. 37, 
Judgment of 13 February 2014. 
89 This was not only based on the limited information in the order for reference, but also because the question 
concerned Article 49 TFEU, whereas the applicants sought market access to particular Italian regions not so much 
to establish themselves, but to provide services in the transport sector on an ad hoc basis. The latter is not governed 
by Article 56 TFEU, but rather by Title VI in Part Three TFEU, which concerns the common transport policy. See id. 
at paras. 40–44. 
90 The CJEU held that the applicants were already authorized to operate a car and driver hire service, but their 
authorizations were temporarily suspended because they did not meet several conditions. They merely aimed to 
strike out some conditions and were thus not challenging the general system of rules governing car and driver hire 
or the way in which authorizations are granted. See ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle 
Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 39, Judgment of 13 Feb. 2014.  
91 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at paras. 40–41. 
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the three companies challenging the measure were at that time only providing certification 
services in Italy.92 The Commission expressed the same view during the hearing.93 Similarly, 
in Ottica New Line a company contested the authorization of a request of a competitor to 
establish an optician’s shop in a Sicilian town because it was in breach of an Italian law’s 
limits relating to population density and on the distance between opticians’ shops. Even 
though AG Jääskinen held that the facts of this case were confined to one Member State 
only, even a single region, without any cross-border elements, the CJEU paid no attention 
whatsoever to the admissibility/jurisdiction question and immediately went to the merits of 
the case.94  
 
II. A Critical View on Oosthoek: Unclear Criteria and a Too Welcoming CJEU 
 
The rather welcoming approach of the CJEU in (some of) the Oosthoek-cases has been 
criticized on various grounds. First of all, at a more fundamental level, the CJEU has been 
criticized for using Article 267 TFEU as a “back-door mechanism” to enlarge its own 
jurisdiction and to extend the benefits of EU law to all EU citizens, including Member States’ 
own nationals.95 The “far from inconceivable” logic that a national measure can have 
potential consequences which are not restricted to a single Member State, is inherent in the 
internal market. The criterion of “far from inconceivable” seems particularly easy to fulfill in 
relation to services because a cross-border element could always be identified from the 
perspective of both service suppliers as well as service recipients.96 Hence, almost all 
national measures that affect businesses can potentially be brought within the scope of EU 
law because it is nearly impossible to completely exclude the possibility that national laws 
lack cross-border effects.97 The CJEU’s easy identification of a cross-border element in 
Trijber, relying on the mere possibility that service recipients are non-nationals, means that 
there will almost always be a cross-border element.98 By applying EU law to all EU citizens, 
including Member States’ own nationals in purely internal situations, the CJEU can be 
                                            
92See ECJ, Case C-593/13, Rina v. Rina Services SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2015:399, para. 14, Judgment of 16 June 2015. 
Likewise, in Femarbel, the CJEU did not pay attention either to the applicability of the Services Directive and 
answered the preliminary references even though the dispute was a purely internal situation. See ECJ, Case C-57/12, 
Femarbel, ECLI:EU:C:2013:517, Judgment of 11 July 2013 
93 See id. at para. 15. 
94See ECJ, Case C-539/11, Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo, ECLI:EU:C:2013:591, Judgment of 26 September 
2013; ECJ, Case C 539/11, Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo, ECLI:EU:C:2013:41, para. 13, Opinion of 30 January 
2013. 
95See Ritter, supra note 59, at 5; Grimbergen, supra note 50, at 58. 
96See Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 177; Ritter, supra note 59, at 4. 
97See Grimbergen, supra note 50, at 58. 
98 See also Case C-98/14, Berlington, ECLI:EU:C:2015:386, para. 23–28, Judgment of 11 June 2015. 
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criticized for interfering with the Member States’ autonomy and competencies going beyond 
the competencies assigned to it and the EU.99 This interference is especially remarkable 
given that the CJEU has never really explained the rationale behind its case law on purely 
internal situations and the “far from inconceivable” logic.100 It seems that the approach of 
the CJEU can primarily be explained by the wish to counter the effects of the reverse 
discrimination stemming from the four fundamental freedoms.101 This is because of the 
seemingly perverse outcome that national measures are contrary to EU law when they are 
applied in cross-border situations, but are perfectly legal in purely internal situations.102 
Nationals or products of a Member State are disadvantaged because a national rule applies 
to them, while the same rule does not apply to nationals/products from other Member 
States because that violates EU law. This outcome seems to have been the main driver of 
the CJEU—for a further discussion of reverse discrimination, see Section F. The CJEU has not 
really addressed the more principled question of how to balance state autonomy and 
alleviate such reverse discrimination.103  
 
As said before, the purely internal situation functions as a “gatekeeper” to the preliminary 
ruling procedure from a procedural point. A refusal on the part of the CJEU to answer 
questions, as in Airport Shuttle Express and Crono Service, does not say anything about the 
legality of the national measure from a substantive point of view. It simply means that the 
measure should be challenged by a different person whose case includes a cross-border 
element or alternatively by the Commission in the context of an infringement procedure 
under Article 258 TFEU.104 In enabling natural or legal persons to challenge national 
measures in purely internal situations, the CJEU essentially broadens indirect access to the 
CJEU. In doing so, the CJEU basically acknowledges the possibility of “my brother’s keeper,” 
situations where nationals challenge restrictive national measures on behalf of persons in 
                                            
99See Ritter, supra note 59, at 3, 12; Opinion of Advocate General Darmon at paras. 10–11, Joined Cases C-297/88 
and C-197/89, Dzodzi v. Belgian (July 3, 1990), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
100See Stefan Enchelmaier, Always at your Service (Within Limits): The CJEU’s Case Law on Article 56 TFEU (2006-
11), 36 EUR. L. REV. 615, 618 (2011). 
101See Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl at para. 17, Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. State (Sept. 13, 2001), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
102 Maduro aptly observed that “EC law obliges States to treat nationals of other Member States in a way which—
by reasons of their own policies and aims—they did not originally intend to treat their own nationals”. Miguel 
Poiares Maduro, The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse 
Discrimination, THE FUTURE OF REMEDIES IN EUROPE 127 (Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz and and Paul Skidmore eds., 
2000). 
103See Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 174, 177. 
104 See id. at 175; ECJ, Case C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 49, Judgment of 15 November 
2016. 
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other Member States.105 The problem with this lenient approach is that it could lead to 
never-ending litigation by individuals and legal persons challenging many rules and 
regulations that obstruct their businesses in their drive towards unlimited deregulation and 
a “market without rules.”106 This risk has become more pertinent recently, because of the 
broad and unclear criterion of “far from inconceivable.” It is not difficult to argue that it is 
fulfilled, as the Dutch CJEU Judge Prechal also noted recently.107  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time, it should be acknowledged that an overly strict approach on 
the part of the CJEU might also be undesirable. If national courts or the parties must prove 
that there is not only a potential interest, but that persons from other Member States are 
actually interested in offering a certain service, this could give rise to problems with respect 
to delivering sufficient proof. In addition, if the CJEU were to require that breaches of 
fundamental freedoms be contested by persons who have already made use, or are trying 
to use, such freedoms, this would prevent the CJEU from examining national measures 
which considerably hamper access to that respective market.108 In this context, one could 
argue that it is undesirable to declare a question inadmissible for being purely internal if 
there is a reasonable chance that the same issue will occur in a case with cross-border 
elements. The case at hand, which is purely internal, shows that the issue as such is not 
merely hypothetical and that economic operators are affected. In terms of efficiency and 
legal certainty, it then seems justifiable to anticipate cross-border situations, instead of 
waiting until they actually occur. 
 
Leaving aside what the correct approach is, the current problem is the seeming inconsistency 
in CJEU case law. Sousa observed in this context that the CJEU is using the purely internal 
situation doctrine strategically as a way to decide which cases it wants to handle itself and 
which should be left to national courts.109 The more liberal approach of the CJEU in Blanco 
Pérez and Trijber can be contrasted with the CJEU’s reluctance to answer in Sbarigia and 
Ragn-Sells. It is therefore unsurprising that in Venturini the opposing parties were both able 
to bolster their arguments with reference to the case law of the CJEU. While Venturini and 
                                            
105 Prechal therefore proposed that the CJEU uses a “Schutznorm,” a relativity requirement, which means that the 
CJEU examines whether the EU law provision relied on also seeks to protect the interests of the plaintiff(s). Prechal 
at the same time noted that the case law of the CJEU does not wholeheartedly support this (yet). See Prechal, supra 
note 12, at 495–96. 
106 See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano at para. 63, Case C-442/02, Caixabank France v. Ministère de 
l'Économie (Mar. 25, 2004), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/; Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro at 
paras. 1, 28, Case C-292/92, Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg (Oct. 27, 1993), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/; Ritter, supra note 59, at 12–13; Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 176, 
178. 
107See Prechal, supra note 12, at 495. 
108See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 70, at para. 36. 
109See Caro de Sousa, THE EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 181, 186 (2015). 
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the Commission referred to Blanco Pérez, the defendant based its arguments on Sbarigia. 
The inconsistent approach is especially problematic for national courts confronted with 
purely internal situations.110 The Dutch Council of State, for example, pointed to the 
seemingly stricter approach of the CJEU in Ragn-Sells in its referral in Trijber.111 It is unclear 
how national courts should explain the way in which foreign market operators might be 
affected. What is the required level of potentiality or inconceivability? Is it necessary to 
prove that companies in other Member States have actually expressed their interest? How 
many foreign clients are needed? What is the threshold?112 Even Judge Prechal noted that 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU lacks clarity in this respect.113 It is particularly the criterion of 
“far from inconceivable” that is not sufficiently distinct and which has therefore led to 
criticisms that the CJEU uses purely internal situation arbitrarily in determining which cases 
it wants to rule on.114  
 
The uncertainty could also affect the uniform application of EU law. On the one hand, some 
national courts, following the strict approach of the CJEU, rightly or wrongly, refrain from 
putting questions to the CJEU because they think that the CJEU cannot help them in such 
purely internal situations. On the other hand, other courts might be tempted to forward 
questions all too eagerly in the hope of benefitting from the accommodating approach of 
the CJEU. In the first scenario, this could mean that national measures conflicting with EU 
law remain unchallenged, because courts wait for a case with a factual constellation 
involving cross-border elements. Such incompliant national measures are more easily 
remedied by courts following the second scenario.  
 
In conclusion, the CJEU should offer more guidance and be more explicit about the exact 
factors to be considered so that national courts stop wasting time and resources on requests 
                                            
110 Several Dutch courts, for example, determined that the operation of ferries between the Dutch mainland and 
islands in the Dutch part of the Wadden Sea amounts to a purely internal situation, while the Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal did not even address this matter, seemingly assuming that EU law applied, because it 
referred a question for a preliminary ruling. See Dutch Council of State, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BU5444, para. 2.5.3, 
Judgment of 23 November 2011; District Court Leeuwarden, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2012:BY5837, para. 9.6.2, Judgment of 
12 December 2012; Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:BZ6922, Judgment of 15 April 
2013. The case was settled and struck out. Case ECJ, C-207/13, Wagenborg Passagiersdiensten BV, Judgment of 13 
May 2014. By contrast, another Dutch court determined that a ferry service, which is primarily used by students 
and day-trippers from the region, could affect the trade between Member States. District Court Rotterdam, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:BZ5824, para. 10.1, Judgment of 28 March 2013. 
111See Dutch Council of State, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:2488, para. 4.10, Judgment of 9 July 2014.  
112See id.; Enchelmaier, supra note 100, at 618. 
113See Prechal, supra note 12, at 495. 
114See Nic Shuibhne, supra note 59, at 741; Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 178. AG Kokott also held that the 
criterion is in need of clarification. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 32. 
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which will never be answered.115 At the same time, it is not only the CJEU who should be 
blamed for its relaxed approach. National courts also have an important responsibility for 
ensuring that their request for a preliminary ruling also includes a detailed and clear 
overview of the factual and national legal context of the case to enable the CJEU to 
determine whether there is a sufficient cross-border element.116 This also means that the 
CJEU itself will be spared unnecessary references which solely relate to internal situations.  
 
E. The Dzodzi Exception: National Law Makes a Renvoi to EU Law in Situations Outside 
the Scope of EU Law 
 
I. The Recent Dzodzi Line of Cases 
 
The CJEU has also accepted jurisdiction and/or declared questions admissible when EU 
provisions are made applicable by national law in situations outside the scope of EU law with 
a renvoi. In such situations, national law voluntarily adopts the same approach as EU law, 
something which has been referred to as “spontaneous harmonization.”117 The CJEU has not 
only been willing to consider renvois in national legislation but has even answered questions 
in relation to references in private law provisions in contracts.118 While Thomasdünger was 
the first judgment in which the CJEU pursued this line, it was in Dzodzi that the CJEU 
extensively set the contours of this second exception.119 In the latter case, Belgian law 
referred to EC law and stipulated that in some case third-country partners of Belgians 
                                            
115 One fruitful starting point for the CJEU might be Belgacom, a public procurement case, where the CJEU offered 
more yardsticks in determining whether there is a certain cross-border interest even though there were no 
economic operators who had actually manifested their interest. The CJEU held that such an interest  might be 
derived from the financial value of the planned agreement, from the location where it is to be performed or its 
technical characteristics. See ECJ, Case C-221/12, Belgacom NV, ECLI:EU:C:2013:736, paras. 28 and 31, Judgment of 
14 November 2013. These yardsticks were subsequently applied in other (procurement) cases as well. See Joined 
Cases C-25/14 and C-26/14, UNIS, ECLI:EU:C:2015:821, para. 28, Judgment of 17 December 2015; Joined Cases C-
458/14 and C-67/15, Promoimpresa, ECLI:EU:C:2016:558, para. 66, Judgment of 14 July 2016. See also Case C-
380/05, Centro Europa 7 v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità, 2008 E.C.R. I-349, para. 67 (referring to the 
earlier referenced “market in question”). 
116 This responsibility of national courts also avoids the misuse of the preliminary ruling procedure. This 
responsibility also stems from the duty of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU. See Prechal, supra note 12; 
Galetta, supra note 43. 
117See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 57, at para. 43; Kaleda, supra note 59, at 2. 
118See Case C-73/89, Fournier v Van Werven, 1992 E.C.R. I-5621; Case C-88/91, Federconsorzi v AIMA, 1992 E.C.R. 
I-4035. 
119 In Thomasdünger, the German court asked for an interpretation of the Common Customs Tariff in a situation 
outside the scope of the Tariff but where the Tariff was made applicable by German rules. Without paying much 
attention to this scope question, the CJEU merely held that “except in exceptional cases in which it is clear that the 
provision of Community law . . . does not apply to the facts of the dispute . . . the Court leaves it to the national 
court to determine . . . whether a preliminary ruling is necessary.” See Case C-166/84, Thomasdünger v. 
Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main, 1985 E.C.R. 3001, para. 11. 
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needed to be treated as if they were EU nationals in order to avoid reverse discrimination. 
AG Darmon held that the question should be declared inadmissible because there was no 
link with EC law.120 The CJEU disagreed because it held that it is not for the CJEU to examine 
the relevance of questions posed by national courts. The CJEU thus declared that it has 
jurisdiction because “it is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that in 
order to forestall future differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be 
given a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is applied.”121  
 
Dzodzi was reaffirmed in what the CJEU itself has referred to as “the Dzodzi line of cases.”122 
This line of cases is, however, not entirely consistent. In some cases, the CJEU examines more 
vigorously the renvoi to EU law. In Kleinwort Benson, the CJEU determined that the reference 
to EU law must be “direct and unconditional” and that the application of EU law needs to be 
“absolutely and unconditionally” binding on a national court. The CJEU did not consider it 
sufficient that the national court is obliged to merely take account of the CJEU’s case law.123 
Nonetheless, in subsequent cases such as Leur-Bloem, the CJEU reaffirmed the “Dzodzi 
principle” and dropped the more restrictive Kleinwort Benson approach.124 In this case, 
Dutch provisions made EU law indirectly applicable by using a language similar to the 
Taxation of Mergers Directive, but not word for word. Even though no explicit reference to 
EU law was made, the intention of the Dutch legislature was that the Dutch law would be 
interpreted in the same way as the Directive.125 Instead of applying the direct and 
unconditional renvoi test of Kleinwort Benson, the CJEU coupled the Dzodzi logic of 
“forestalling future differences” with the notion of “same solutions” approach. It declared 
that it is in the EU’s interest for the CJEU to answer questions “where, in regulating purely 
internal situations, domestic legislation adopts the same solutions as those adopted in 
Community law.”126 In other cases, the CJEU also noted in very general terms that the 
national provision refers to EU law while not paying much attention to Kleinwort Benson 
criteria.127 In other cases, the CJEU also accepted indirect and implicit references to EU 
                                            
120See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 99. 
121See Joined Cases 297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 1990 E.C.R. I-3763, para. 37.  
122See Case C-130/95, Giloy v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost, 1997 E.C.R. I-4291, para. 23; Case C-28/95, 
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen, 1997 E.C.R. I-4161, para. 27. 
123See also Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro at para. 10, Case C-346/93, Kleinwort Benson v. City of Glasgow 
(Jan. 31, 1995), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
124See Ritter, supra note 59, at 8; Takis Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance 
in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 34 (2003). 
125See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 13, 43. 
126See Leur-Bloem, Case C-28/95 at para. 32. 
127See Case C-247/97, Schoonbroodt v. Belgian, 1998 E.C.R. I-8095, para. 15; Case C-222/01, British American 
Tobacco v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld, 2004 E.C.R. I-4683. But see Case C-2/97, IP, 1998 E.C.R. I-8597, paras. 59–62. 
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law.128 In BIAO, the CJEU considered questions admissible even though German provisions 
did not reproduce the EU law verbatim, but the CJEU especially attached weight to the factor 
that its interpretation would be binding on the referring court.129 The latter finding was, 
however, disputed by AG Jacobs.130 In Kofisa Italia, a 1972 Italian decree on VAT referred to 
customs legislation. The Italian court asked the CJEU about the Community Customs Code, 
but this Code did not exist when the decree came into existence in 1972.131 In addition, both 
the Italian government and the Commission noted that they are unsure whether the national 
dispute would be solved by applying EU rules.132 The CJEU, nonetheless, held that there was 
nothing in the file suggesting that the referring court could depart from the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the Customs Code.133 This latter notion that there is nothing in the case file 
indicating otherwise has since then be repeated in other cases as well.134 
 
In several recent cases, the CJEU has also used the “same solutions” idea from Leur-Bloem 
in a mantra-like way. The CJEU has simply stated that it should answer questions in cases 
where, in regulating purely internal situations, domestic legislation seeks to adopt the same 
solutions as those in EU law, such as the avoidance of discrimination against its own 
nationals (see section F), any distortion of competition and the provision for a single 
procedure in comparable situations as such solutions.135 The CJEU easily accepted to answer 
questions in Unamar and Quenon about agency contracts for the sale of banking services 
and insurance falling outside the scope of a directive on self-employed commercial agents 
negotiating the sale or the purchase of only goods. It simply noted that the Belgian 
legislature had decided to apply the same treatment to agency contracts for goods and those 
relating to services.136 This rather easy reliance on the intention of the legislature is also 
                                            
128See Case C-1/99, Kofisa Italia v. Ministero delle Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi, 2001 E.C.R. I-207, 
paras. 30–32; Case C-267/99, Adam, 2001, E.C.R. I-7467, paras. 27–32; Ritter, supra note 59, at 9.  
129See Case C-306/99, BIAO, 2003 E.C.R. I-1, para. 92. 
130 AG Jacobs noted that the parties were unable to satisfactorily explain the approach of German courts. See 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at paras. 50, 61. 
131 See Tridimas, supra note 124, at 36. 
132See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo at para. 47, C-1/99, Kofisa Italia (Sept. 26, 2000), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
133 Kofisa Italia, Case C-1/99 at para. 31. 
134See Case C-3/04, Poseidon Chartering v. Marianne Zeeschip VOF, et. al., 2006 E.C.R. I-2505, para. 18. 
135 See e.g. Case C-482/10, Cicala v. Regione Siciliana, 2011 E.C.R. I-14139, para. 18; Case C-203/09, Volvo Car 
Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-10721, paras. 24, 25. 
136See ECJ, Case C-338/14, Quenon v. Beobank & Metlife Insurance, ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, paras. 16–18, Judgment of 
3 December 2015; ECJ C-184/12, Unamar, ECLI:EU:C:2013:663, paras. 30–31, Judgment of 17 October 2013. 
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visible in other cases.137 The CJEU has been especially lenient in EU competition law and 
(implicit) references to Article 101 TFEU.138 
 
As with the first exception, the CJEU’s approach has not been entirely consistent. The CJEU 
sometimes employed a stricter approach enforcing the Kleinwort Benson criteria based on 
the order for reference or from the file submitted to the Court.139 In Nolan, the CJEU held 
that it is necessary to verify on the basis of “sufficiently precise indications” whether the 
renvoi is made in a direct and unconditional way.140 The CJEU concluded that this was not 
the case because the respective Directive was not “automatically applicable” in situations as 
in the case at hand.141 In Agafiţei, the CJEU declared the reference inadmissible, especially 
because it was unclear whether the Romanian legislature intended to adopt the “same 
solutions.”142 In Parva Investitsionna Banka, the referring court sought an interpretation of 
Regulation No. 1896/2006, which created a European order for payment procedure to fill a 
lacuna in the Bulgarian legislation. The CJEU, based on a relatively detailed analysis, felt that 
very general references to international treaties and general principles of Bulgarian law are 
not enough in the light of the Kleinwort Benson requirements.143 Likewise, in other cases the 
CJEU declared questions inadmissible because it was not clear that it was necessary for the 
                                            
137 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-522/12, Isbir v. DB Services GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2013:711, paras. 28–31, Judgment of 7 
November 2013; Case C-352/08, Modehuis A. Zwijnenburg, 2010 E.C.R. I-4303, para. 33; ECJ, Case C-603/10 Pelati, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:639, paras. 15–20, Judgment of 18 October 2012. The CJEU has been willing to disregard the 
intention of the legislature in Nolan, where it held that there was no Union interest to protect uniformity, because 
the EU legislature had stated unequivocally that the relevant Directive did not apply to a precise area in relation to 
which the UK made that Directive applicable. See ECJ, Case C-583/10, U.S.A. v. Nolan, ECLI:EU:C:2012:638, para.  56, 
Judgment of 18 October 2012. 
138See Case C-217/05, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, 2006 E.C.R. I-11987, para. 
22; C-280/06, ETI, 2007 E.C.R. I-10893, para. 24; ECJ, Case C-172/14, ING Pensii v. Consiliul Concurenței, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:272, Judgment of 16 July 2015; Maxima Latvija, Case C-345/14 at para. 13. Those judgments can be 
contrasted with cases in which the CJEU applies the Kleinwort Benson criteria more clearly. See ECJ, Case C-32/11, 
Allianz v. Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:160, Judgment of 14 March 2013; Case C-413/13, FNV Kiem v. 
Staat der Nederlanden, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, Judgment of 4 December 2014. 
139See Case C-470/13, Generali-Providencia Biztosító Zrt v. Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2469, para. 25, Judgment of 18 December 2014. 
140See Case C-583/10, U.S.A. v. Nolan, ECLI:EU:C:2012:638, para. 48, 18 October 2012. 
141 See id. at para. 49. 
142See Case C-310/10, Ministerul Justiţiei și Libertăţilor Cetăţenești v. Agafiţei, 2011 E.C.R. I-5989, para. 43. 
143See Case C-488/13, Parva Investitsionna Banka and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2191, paras. 21–36, Judgment of 9 
September 2014. 
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referring court to rely on an interpretation of EU law to establish the meaning of the 
applicable national rules.144 
 
Another good example is Cicala, where the CJEU explicitly restated the Kleinwort Benson 
restrictions by noting that the reference to EU law’s applicability was not made in a direct 
and unconditional way in the national law. The CJEU held that the renvoi was tied too 
generally to unspecified principles without identifying specific rules of EU law with respect 
to the duty to state reasons, such as Article 296 TFEU or Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter.145 
Neither did the referring court explain whether the renvoi also sets aside the Italian rules 
dealing with the obligation to state reasons. This also meant that the latter provisions “are 
applicable without limitation” to the case at hand, as a result of which the renvoi is not 
unconditional either. There is consequently no “definite interest” of the EU in guaranteeing 
uniformity of interpretation of those EU law provisions.146 The CJEU hence declined 
jurisdiction. In two subsequent cases, Romeo and De Bellis, the CJEU also held that it has no 
jurisdiction and reiterated this view in questions about the same Italian legal provision, 
noting that the referring court failed to provide any evidence to the contrary.147 The referring 
court did not, for example, show that the objective of the (general) renvoi is to guarantee 
that internal situations and situations falling within the scope of EU law are treated 
identically.148  
 
II. A Critical View on Dzodzi: A Partial Application of the Stricter Kleinwort Benson Criteria 
 
The Dzodzi line of cases has been fervently criticized in academic literature and has met 
fierce resistance from Advocate Generals in the 1990s and early 2000s.149 Despite these 
fundamental objections and heavy AG criticism, the CJEU has not really reconsidered its 
Dzodzi judgment as the preceding analysis shows as well.150 An illustration of this is that the 
                                            
144See ECJ, Case C-92/14, Tudoran, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2051, para. 41, Judgment of 3 July 2014; ECJ, Case C-139/12, 
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, ECLI:EU:C:2014:174, para. 46, Judgment of 20 March 2014; ECJ, Case C-
351/14, Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez, ECLI:EU:C:2016:447, Judgment of 16 June 2016. 
145See Case C-482/10, Cicala, 2011 E.C.R. I-14139, para. 25. 
146See id. at para. 29. 
147See Case C-313/12, Romeo, ECLI:EU:C:2013:718, para. 33, Judgment of 7 November 2013; Case C-246/14, De 
Bellis, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2291, Judgment of 15 October 2014. 
148See Case C-313/12, Romeo, ECLI:EU:C:2013:718, para. 31–32, Judgment of 7 November 2013. 
149See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at para. 22. 
150 See the request for a reconsideration in Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra 123, at para. 27; Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at para. 1. 
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Dzodzi and Leur-Bloem logic is cited almost three times as much as Kleinwort Benson.151 
What’s more, the analysis above shows that there is still not much consistency between both 
lines of cases.152 It is therefore somewhat surprising that the criticism in the literature and 
among AGs seems to have evaporated in recent years.153 AG Kokott even “defended” the 
Dzodzi line of cases in the competition case of ETI by arguing that the rationale behind the 
CJEU uniformly interpreting EU law in purely internal situations is ensuring legal certainty by 
creating comparable competition conditions for all operators.154 Others, including AG Wahl, 
also noted that the text of Article 267 TFEU does not preclude the CJEU from ruling on renvoi 
cases, because it merely provides that a question of interpretation of EU rules must be 
“raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State” when “it considers that a decision 
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment.” Several AGs also argue, in line 
with the CJEU approach discussed in section B, that the generous approach of the CJEU 
coincides with the spirit of cooperation between the CJEU and national courts.155 Even 
though the Dzodzi line of cases is no longer heavily criticized, it remains worthwhile to repeat 
some of the earlier comments and critically discuss the case law in the light of this. Instead 
of suggesting that the CJEU should do away with its approach, the main aim of the following 
overview is to explain that there is a need for the CJEU to employ a more consistent and 
stricter approach in line with Kleinwort Benson.  
 
One point of criticism relates to the fact that the CJEU bases its jurisdiction on national law 
instead of EU law proper.156 The CJEU extends the scope of EU law through unilateral and 
                                            
151 Twenty-three judgments with references to “Dzodzi” and twelve judgments with references to “Kleinwort 
Benson” were found relevant because the CJEU, and not the parties, that referred to these cases in relation to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU or the admissibility of the questions and not so much in relation the material legal issues 
involved. Relevant references to “Leur Bloem” were found in nineteen judgments of which six also included a 
reference to “Dzodzi.” Searches conducted on Apr. 13, 2016 on curia.europa.eu.  
152 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at para. 40. 
153 AG are currently not questioning the approach of the CJEU, but primarily call for a greater consistency and a 
more careful examination. E.g. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano at para. 28, C-6/01, Anomar (Feb. 11, 2003), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/.  
154See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 54, C-280/06, ETI (July 3, 2007), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. The objective of achieving the single market is also often the idea 
behind the legislature’s choice to use the wording as laid down in EU law for purely internal situations as well. See  
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 13 (articulating the argument of the Dutch State 
Secretary). 
155 See e.g. AG Wahl’s defense of the “relatively generous” approach by the CJEU in Opinion of Advocate General 
Wahl, supra note 70, at paras. 29–30. Lenaerts also held that the Dzodzi principle falls within the interpretative 
jurisdiction of the CJEU. See Koen Lenaerts & Dirk Arts, Procedural Law of the European Union, para. 6023 (Sweet 
& Maxwell 1999). 
156 This was specifically brought up by AG Jacobs, one of the most vocal opponents of an all too welcoming CJEU 
approach. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 69; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 
supra note 40, at paras. 62–63. 
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independent references in national laws.157 It could also be argued that by promoting the 
application of EU law beyond its original scope, the CJEU is assuming powers not assigned 
to it by the Treaties, creating a tension with the principle of attributed competences.158 
Given this points of criticism, AG Darmon referred to the Dzodzi line of cases as an “ill-
defined cooperation” falling “outside the confined and precise aims of the preliminary ruling 
mechanism,” while Rasmussen spoke about an “erroneous interpretation” of Article 267 
TFEU.159  
 
There are also some more practical problems that could result from the reliance on national 
law for the CJEU’s jurisdiction in such purely internal situations. One consequence could be 
that there is considerable divergence across Member States as to the jurisdiction that the 
CJEU enjoys and hence the protection that individuals can derive from EU law, albeit 
indirectly.160 In Member States where there are many renvois this jurisdiction and protection 
could be more extensive. In addition, the reliance on national law could create an imbalance 
in the sense that the Commission cannot start infringement proceedings in relation to 
Member State’s (in)actions following CJEU’s rulings in the Dzodzi type of situations. This is 
because those purely internal situations formally fall outside of the scope of EU law so that 
it might be difficult to speak of a Member State’s failure to fulfill an obligation under the 
Treaties in the sense of Article 258 TFEU.161  
 
The third point of criticism is that in the Dzodzi line of cases the CJEU is interpreting EU law 
“irrespective of the circumstances in which it is applied” as the CJEU itself has consistently 
asserted.162 This means in essence that the CJEU is interpreting EU law outside its proper 
context thereby risking to neglect all important factors or being deceived by irrelevant 
aspects related to the particular set-up of the respective national legal system.163 AG Jacobs 
illustrated this problem with reference to Leur-Bloem dealing with a purely domestic 
transaction involving a restructuring of the ownership of companies which appears to have 
hardly any connection with the transactions envisaged in the Tax Directive on cross-border 
                                            
157See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 99, at paras. 8–9. 
158See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra 123, at paras. 25, 27; Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, 
supra note 132, at paras. 33–35; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at para. 59. 
159 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 99, at para 12; Hjalte Rasmussen, Remedying the Crumbling 
EC Judicial System, 37 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1083 (2000). 
160See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 69.  
161See id. at para. 44. 
162See id. at para. 50. For later reaffirmations, see e.g. Case C-413/13, NV Kunsten Informatie en Media, para. 18, 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://curia.europa.eu/. 
163 See id. at para. 52. See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at paras. 52–57; Opinion of 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at paras. 30–32. 
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mergers to which the Dutch provisions made a renvoi. The domestic restructuring might also 
be carried out for reasons primarily related to the Dutch system which are completely 
different from those foreseen in this Directive relating to removing tax obstacles for cross-
border groupings and avoiding tax avoidance.164 Given this different context, there is hardly 
a “focus for debate” for the CJEU which can only be remedied by drawing from “fictitious 
situations.”165 The latter is not free from problems. AG Jacobs pointed to the CJEU’s own 
case law in which the CJEU underlines the importance of taking account of a different 
context when interpreting provisions in different documents.166 Because of such potential 
different contexts, it is not evident that the CJEU’s interpretation in renvoi cases will also be 
relevant and useful for the national court to solve the dispute in the main proceedings.167  
 
The Dzodzi line of cases can be criticized for the CJEU’s heavy dependence on the whims of 
the national judiciary. The reluctance on the part of the CJEU to examine the Kleinwort 
Benson conditions stems from an idea that given the earlier discussed division of functions 
between the national courts and the CJEU it is only for national courts to examine the exact 
scope of the national reference to EU law, see section B.168 This deferential approach is also 
visible in the often repeated notion that:  
 
Consideration of the limits which the national legislature 
may have placed on the application of Community law 
to purely internal situations, to which it is applicable only 
through the operation of the national legislation, is a 
matter of domestic law and hence falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member 
State.169  
 
The generous approach could be particularly problematic in renvoi cases when it is unclear 
whether the referring court is also legally bound by the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law.170 
                                            
164See id. at paras. 53 and 58. 
165See id. at paras. 54–55. 
166See id. at para. 56; ECJ, Case C-221/11, Demirkan, ECLI:EU:C:2013:583, para. 47, Judgment of 24 September 2013. 
167See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 123, at para. 15. 
168 See e.g. Case C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, 2008 E.C.R. I-10627, para. 27; Joined Cases C-439/07 and 
C-499/07, KBC Bank, 2009 E.C.R. I-4409, para. 60; Case C-352/08, Modehuis A. Zwijnenburg, 2010 E.C.R. I-4303, 
para. 34; ECJ, Case C-603/10, Pelati, ECLI:EU:C:2012:639, para. 19, Judgment of 18 October 2012. 
169 See Joined Cases 297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, 1990 E.C.R. I-3763, at para. 42; Case C-28/95, Leur-Bloem v. 
Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen, 1997 E.C.R. I-4161, para. 33. E.g. Case C-48/07, Les Vergers du 
Vieux Tauves, 2008 E.C.R. I-10627, para. 27. 
170 It is remarkable that the CJEU itself acknowledged in Fournier that it is only for the national court to give a 
meaning to provisions of national law “which it considers appropriate, without being bound in that regard by the 
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When the CJEU does not take up this issue, it is essentially performing tasks it refused to do 
for good reasons, namely by giving answers that are “purely advisory and without binding 
effects.”171 It seems logical that the CJEU  closely scrutinizes the national court’s obligations 
in relation to the CJEU’s interpretation.172 It should be welcomed that the CJEU did so in 
Allianz. In this case, the CJEU was confronted with the Hungarian competition law which 
used “identical concepts” as Article 101 TFEU, even though no explicit references were made 
to EU law in the text of the Hungarian legislation. The Explanatory Memorandum, however, 
justified the legislative proposal on the basis of requirements of EU law.173 The CJEU 
accepted jurisdiction and attached value to the fact that the order for reference showed that 
the Hungarian Supreme Court is bound by the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.174 
But even when the national court is obliged on paper to apply the interpretation of the CJEU 
in a purely internal situation, this still does not completely preclude national courts from 
disregarding the CJEU interpretation because they might argue that the context of the CJEU’s 
interpretation is different or that the situation falls outside the scope of EU law.175 The 
obligation for national courts to apply EU law provisions and the CJEU’s interpretation 
thereof can also be changed by the legislature or court judgments when that requirement 
stems from case law.176 It is unclear what legal consequences ensue when courts depart 
from the requested CJEU interpretation in renvoi situations. As stated above, it is unlikely 
that the Commission can start infringement proceedings, nor does state liability on the basis 
of Köbler seem to offer a suitable form of redress.177 One related issue which has not been 
solved yet by the CJEU is the question as to whether there is also an obligation on the part 
                                            
meaning which must be attributed to the same expression as used in the Directive.” See Case C-73/89, Fournier, 
1992 E.C.R. I-5621, para. 23. AG Tesauro held that this acknowledgment by the CJEU of the lacking binding effects 
“raise[s] serious doubts”. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 123, at para. 24. 
171See Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079, para. 4; Case C-346/93, Kleinwort Benson, 1995 E.C.R. I-615, para. 24. 
172 AG Darmon held that the CJEU should not give “advice of the kind which a legal expert is sometimes called upon 
to give in a domestic court when it is required to apply foreign law.” See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, 
supra note 99., at para. 12. The absence of any binding force of EU law was also the reason for AG Mancini’s refusal 
to answer questions in Thomasdünger. See Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Case C-166/84, Thomasdünger 
(May 15, 1985), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
173See ECJ, Case C-32/11, Allianz v. Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:160, paras. 3–5, Judgment of 14 March 
2013. 
174 See id. at paras. 18 and 22. 
175See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 70; Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, 
supra note 132, at para. 38. Tridimas also expressed doubts as to whether CJEU judgments are binding in cases 
where the facts fall outside the scope of EU law. See Tridimas, supra note 124, at 36. 
176See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at para. 50; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra 
note 8, at para. 43. 
177 See supra notes 33–36; Jasper Krommendijk, “Open Sesame!” Improving Access to the CJEU by Obliging National 
Courts to Reason Their Refusals to Refer, 42 EUR. L. REV. 57–58 (2017). 
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of the highest national courts to refer in renvoi cases. This does not seem to be the case. 
There is no obligation to apply EU law because EU law only applies on the basis of national 
law.178 There is likely significant uncertainty on the part of the highest courts about this, 
especially in the light of the recent case law of the CJEU and ECtHR with respect to their 
duties to refer.179 
 
In light of these four lines of criticism, the CJEU should more strictly apply the two-pronged 
test of Kleinwort Benson.180 The community should welcome the CJEU’s increasing 
willingness to examine the renvoi.181 As outlined in section B, this is not an easy task for the 
CJEU. When the CJEU has to examine the question of whether its interpretation in renvoi 
situations is binding for the referring court, the CJEU must grapple with questions about 
national laws because the CJEU essentially has to judge the work of the national court.182 
The CJEU should also avoid doing “guesswork” and conducting this analysis on the basis of 
its own specialist knowledge because this could mean that not all Member States are treated 
equally.183 So it is safest for the CJEU to rely on the national court. This, however, means that 
the CJEU only knows that the EU is applicable because the referring national court tells it 
so.184 As with the first Oosthoek exception, the stricter approach on the part of the CJEU 
should be coupled with increased efforts on the part of national courts to show that the 
Kleinwort Benson criteria are fulfilled and that they are obliged to follow the requested 
interpretation of the CJEU. It is the responsibility of national courts to offer enough 
information so that it is clear for the CJEU that an answer is “objectively required.”185 This is 
easier said than done. There is currently a perverse encouragement in the sense that 
                                            
178See Tridimas, supra note 124, at 37. 
179See ECJ, Case C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva v. Estados português, ECLI:EU:C:2015:565, paras. 44–45, Judgment of 9 
September 2015; ECJ, Joined Cases C-72/14 and C-197/14, X and van Dijk, ECLI:EU:C:2015:564, Judgment of 9 
September 2015; Dhahbi v Italy, App. No. 17120/09 (Apr. 8, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-142504; 
Schipani and Others v Italy, App. No. 38369/09 (Oct. 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156258. See 
also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 40, at para. 64. 
180 This is also more in line with the CJEU’s case law, beginning with Telemarsicabruzzo, finding that questions need 
not be answered because the referring court failed to clarify the factual and legislative context of its questions. See 
Joined Cases C-320/90 to 322/90, Telemarsicabruzzo, 1993 E.C.R. I-393; Case C-234/12, Sky Italia, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:496, paras. 30–33. AG Jacobs considered the Dzodzi line of cases to be “irreconcilable” with this 
case law. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 51. 
181 See supra notes 139–148. See also ECJ, C-281/15, Sahyouni, ECLI:EU:C:2016:343, para. 25–33, Judgment of 12 
May 2016; ECJ, Joined Cases C-692/15 to C-694/15, Security Service v. Ministero dell'Interno, ECLI:EU:C:2016:344, 
paras. 26–31, Judgment of 12 May 2016. 
182See generally Barnard & Sharpston, supra note 39.  
183 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 53. 
184 See Enchelmaier, supra note 100, at 617. 
185See Ritter, supra note 59, at 12. 
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national courts wishing to shield their own Member State’s legislation from scrutiny can 
easily circumvent the CJEU’s by not including anything in the order for reference. With such 
a “bad” reference, a national court could thus fulfil its obligation to refer, but still prevent 
scrutiny by the CJEU.  
 
A stricter CJEU approach might eventually result in a lower number of requests being 
answered, at least in the short term before national courts become accustomed to the 
stricter approach of the CJEU. This raises the question as to how problematic it is from the 
perspective of EU law when the CJEU declines to answer more questions for failing to specify 
the factual and especially legal context or for not satisfying the Kleinwort Benson criteria. 
The rationale of the Dzodzi line of cases is primarily “forestalling future differences” in order 
to guarantee the uniformity of EU law. The CJEU has, however, never really specified these 
risks for the uniformity.186 AG Jacobs noted that the risks for the uniformity of EU law are 
only indirect and temporary and that such “remote threats” can easily be challenged when 
an erroneous interpretation is also applied in a situation governed by EU law.187 It could even 
be argued that by easily accepting renvoi cases, the CJEU is increasing its own case docket 
and thereby delaying the length of proceedings of “genuine” references which might 
discourage national courts from sending requests and thereby paradoxically affecting the 
uniformity of EU law.188 On a more pragmatic note, the CJEU could decrease its workload 
and save its own resources, something which still seems desirable in the light of the record 
number of references.189  
  
In summary, national courts should carefully show in their request for a preliminary ruling 
why they consider the Kleinwort Benson criteria to be fulfilled in renvoi cases. The CJEU 
should assess more intensely than it has done before whether those criteria are fulfilled. 
 
  
                                            
186See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at para. 36. 
187See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 49; AG Darmon also noted that the unity of the 
EU legal order is not affected by purely internal situations. See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 
99, at paras. 8–9.  
188See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at para. 41. 
189 This is also desirable in the light of the potentially large number of situations in which Member States make EU 
law applicable outside the scope of EU law application. See Ritter, supra note 59, at 10; Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs, supra note 8, at paras. 62, 66; Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra 123, at para. 26. 
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F. The Guimont Exception of Prohibiting Reverse Discrimination 
 
I. The Recent Guimont Case Law of the CJEU 
 
One particular expression of the third exception is articulated in the line of cases starting 
with Guimont in which the CJEU gives a potential useful reply in case the national law of the 
Member State prohibits reverse discrimination of its own nationals and grants them the 
same rights as nationals of other Member States. Mr. Guimont, a French national, was 
prosecuted for selling “Emmenthal” in France even though this label could on the basis of 
French legislation only be used for cheese with a hard rind of yellow color.190 AG Saggio 
recommended not to answer the question because “it cannot be of any relevance” in a 
dispute of a purely internal nature.191 The CJEU then held that “a reply might be useful to it 
[the national court] if its national law were to require, in proceedings such as those in this 
case, that a national producer must be allowed to enjoy the same rights as those which a 
producer of another Member State would derive from Community law in the same 
situation.”192 The difference between this “Guimont principle” and the Dzodzi logic is that 
the national court does not need to prove that national law actually prohibits reverse 
discrimination, nor is the CJEU examining this “not further substantiated possibility.”193 
Guimont had thus been referred to as an even more “relaxed version of Dzodzi” heralding a 
shift to an even more deferential approach of the CJEU whereby the CJEU is answering a 
question that might eventually not be raised, “just in case.”194  
 
The Guimont principle has subsequently been used in other cases.195 In several cases, 
especially the older ones, the CJEU does not examine at all whether the national law actually 
requires that the Member State’s own national must be allowed to enjoy the same rights as 
those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same 
situation.196 When the CJEU is checking that, it does so in a rather marginal way. In Susisalo, 
                                            
190See Case C-448/98, Guimont, 2000 E.C.R. I-10663. 
191See Opinion of Advocate General Saggio at para. 7, Case C-448/98, Guimont (Mar. 9, 2000), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 
192See Case C-448/98, Guimont, 2000 E.C.R. I-10663, para. 23. 
193See Ritter, supra note 59, at 8; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 46. 
194See Enchelmaier, supra note 100, at 617; Ritter, supra note 59, at 9; Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra 
note 123, at para. 24. 
195 E.g. Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla v. Miloni, 2006 E.C.R. I-11421, para. 31; Case C-250/03, Mauri v. 
Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato presso la Corte d'appello di Milano, 2005 E.C.R. 
I-1267, para. 21.  
196See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 70, at para. 42; See also Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to 
C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch, 2002, E.C.R. I-2157, para. 26; C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori 
Commercialisti, 2006 E.C.R. I-2941, para. 29 Case C-6/01, Anomar, 2003 E.C.R. I-8621, para. 41; Blanco Pérez, 2010 
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the CJEU, for example, simply referred to the statements of the representative of the 
applicant who stated that provisions in the Finnish administrative law ensure that Finnish 
nationals do not suffer reverse discrimination.197 In Duomo GPA, the CJEU suggested that 
the national court should merely explain that the lawfulness of the national legislation 
depends on the CJEU’s interpretation.198  
 
The Guimont principle has also been used in conjunction with the Oosthoek line of cases 
about potential cross-border effects. The CJEU used it as an additional reason for its 
conclusion that it should have jurisdiction and/or that the questions are admissible, after 
having considered that other nationals might be interested in offering their services.199 In 
Centro Europa 7, the CJEU left it to the national court to determine the cross-border interest 
after having determined that undertakings in other Member States have been or would be 
interested, but held that it is “in any event” necessary to answer the question, because such 
a reply might be useful if Italian law prohibits reverse discrimination.200 The CJEU has 
frequently used the following double negative to accept questions: “Since it is not obvious 
that the interpretation of European Union law would not be of use in enabling the referring 
court to proceed to a determination of the case” (emphasis added).201 
 
Just as with the Oosthoek line of cases, the CJEU has recently adopted a more restrictive 
approach in some cases, even though the CJEU has not pursued this approach consistently 
in all cases as illustrated by Duomo GPA, Susisalo, and Garkalns. Nonetheless, there is clearly 
a trend towards more intensely examining requests for a preliminary ruling on the basis of 
the information provided by the national court in the order for reference.202 In Omalet, the 
CJEU declined to answer questions in purely internal situations, because the referring court 
made clear that Article 49 EC (currently Article 56 TFEU) does not apply to purely internal 
situations and a rule against reverse discrimination does not exist in the national legal 
                                            
E.C.R. I-4629, paras. 35–36; C-280/06, ETI, 2007 E.C.R. I-10893, para. 20; Case C-300/01, Salzmann, 2003 E.C.R. I-
4899, para. 39. 
197See ECJ, Case C-84/11, Susisalo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:374, para. 21, Judgment of 21 June 2012; Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 48. 
198See Joined Cases C-357/10 to C-359/10, Duomo Gpa, ECLI:EU:C:2012:283, para. 28, Judgment of 10 May 2012.  
199See ECJ, Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, ECLI:EU:C:2013:791, para. 26, Judgment of 5 December 
2013; ECJ, C-470/11, Garkalns, ECLI:EU:C:2012:505, para. 20, Judgment of 19 July 2012. 
200 Case C-380/05, Centro Europa 7 v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità, 2008 E.C.R. I-349, para. 68–69. 
201See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen at para. 17, Case C-539/11, Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo (Jan. 
30, 2013), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. See also ECJ, Case C-327/12, SOA Nazionale Costruttori, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:827, para. 22, Judgment of 12 December 2013 (“Nothing in the file suggests that the main 
proceedings will not be settled by application of rules of Community law.”).  
202See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 47. 
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order.203 In Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona, the CJEU also based itself on the order for 
reference and held that national law, as confirmed by constitutional case law, outlaws 
reverse discrimination.204 Likewise, in other cases, the CJEU declared questions inadmissible 
because the order did not provide any indications that national law prohibits reverse 
discrimination.205 In Paola C., the CJEU even held in rather explicit terms that “it is not for 
the Court to take such an initiative if it is not apparent from the order for reference that the 
national court is actually under such an obligation.”206  
 
II. A Critical View on Guimont: CJEU is Answering Hypothetical Questions 
 
The criticism expressed earlier in relation to Dzodzi is even more warranted in relation to 
the Guimont principle because the CJEU is answering a question that might eventually not 
be raised “just in case.”207 Ritter aptly described the approach of the CJEU in the following 
terms: “Dear national court, your question is actually not necessary to rule on the underlying 
case, but just in case your national law prohibits reverse discrimination (and we won’t bother 
checking whether that’s actually the case here), we will give you a reply.”208 Such a 
“theoretical” CJEU judgment conflicts with another strand in the case law of the CJEU 
whereby the CJEU refused answering hypothetical questions.209 The Guimont case law is 
thus essentially a partial return to pre-Foglia liberal case law in which the CJEU exercised 
more deference towards the national courts’ questions.210  
 
In line with the discussion of the criticism in relation to the Dzodzi line of cases, the stricter 
approach of the CJEU in the recent cases discussed at the end of the previous subsection, 
reflecting the earlier discussed Kleinwort Benson criteria, is to be welcomed.211 The stricter 
                                            
203 See Omalet, Case C-245/09 at paras. 16–17; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 70, at para. 45. 
204See ECJ, Case C-111/12, Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona e Provincia, ECLI:EU:C:2013:100, paras. 34–35, 
Judgment of 21 February 2013. 
205See ECJ, Case C-92/14, Tudoran, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2051, para. 41, Judgment of 3 July 2014; ECJ, Case C-139/12, 
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, ECLI:EU:C:2014:174, para. 46, Judgment of 20 March 2014. 
206See ECJ, Case C-122/13, Paola C., ECLI:EU:C:2014:59, para. 15, Judgment of 30 January 2014. 
207See Enchelmaier, supra note 100, at 617. 
208See Ritter, supra note 59, at 4. 
209See Case 244/80, Foglia v Novello (II), 1981 E.C.R. 3045, para. 18; Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, supra 
note 123, at para. 24; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 81, at para. 31; C. Ritter, supra note 59, at 
11.  
210See Ritter, supra note 59, at 11; Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 176.  
211 The merging of the CJEU’s approach in relation to the second and third exception is to be welcomed as well. As 
mentioned, the Guimont principle is basically a more specific form of a renvoi. Abandoning the Guimont principle 
as a distinct category is therefore not to be pitied. See Ritter, supra note 59, at 12. 
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CJEU compels national courts to be more diligent in writing their request for a preliminary 
ruling. 
 
G. Conclusion 
 
The critical discussion of the CJEU case law on the purely internal situation doctrine and its 
exceptions show that there is a need for the CJEU to be stricter and more careful in 
defending its gates. The CJEU should apply its Kleinwort Benson criteria more stringently in 
relation to the Dzodzi and Guimont type of cases. The CJEU should thus signal to national 
courts that it is guarding its gates more intensely and that national courts should provide 
more detailed information as to the fulfillment of one of the three exceptions.212 Instead of 
turning the three exceptions into the rule, the CJEU should treat the three exceptions in the 
way they were originally envisaged: Exceptions. This stricter approach makes it necessary 
that the CJEU looks a bit more over the national judge’s shoulder, which changes the 
cooperative dynamic by putting the CJEU into a more vertical position vis-à-vis national 
courts, as discussed in section B.213 National courts can easily avoid an all too conflictual 
relationship by taking their responsibility offering the necessary information for the CJEU so 
as to avoid a CJEU that is primarily correcting national courts.  
 
The recent Grand Chamber judgment in Ullens de Schooten is a step in the right direction 
“after many years of disorderly case law.”214 In that judgment, the CJEU makes clear that the 
onus is on the referring court to indicate specifically in the order for reference why any of 
the exceptions apply and what the “connecting factor” with EU law is.215 In this context, the 
CJEU also points to Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure.216 This provision stipulates the 
requirements for the content of the request for a preliminary ruling, including a summary of 
the subject-matter of the dispute and the relevant findings of fact, the national legal 
framework and the reasons for submitting a question. Even though this stricter approach of 
                                            
212 One alternative proposal is the application of a Schutznorm. This doctrine does, however, not yet have a solid 
position in EU law, so it seems more logical that the CJEU base itself on its previous case law and builds on the 
earlier developed criteria. See Prechal, supra note 12 and supra note 105. 
213 See supra notes 33–36. 
214See Daniel Sarmiento, The Purely Internal Situation in Free Movement Rules. Some Clarity at Last from the CJEU, 
EU Law Analysis, (Nov. 16, 2016), https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2016/11/the-purely-internal-situation-in-
free.html. 
215See ECJ, Case C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 54–55, Judgment of 15 November 2016; 
Joined Cases C-532/15 and ECJ, Case C-538/15, Eurosaneamientos, ECLI:EU:C:2016:932, paras. 46–48, Judgment of 
8 December 2016. 
216 See id. respectively at paras. 55 and para. 47. For earlier references to this article in relation to the purely internal 
situations, see ECJ, Joined Cases C-692/15 to C-694/15, Security Service v. Ministero dell'Interno, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:344, paras. 18, Judgment of 12 May 2016; Case C-246/14, De Bellis, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2291, Judgment 
of 15 October 2014. 
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the CJEU should be commended, it does not settle all problematic issues. This includes the 
problem that in several Oosthoek cases the CJEU simply declared questions admissible, 
because “it is by no means inconceivable” that undertakings established in other Member 
States were or are interested in offering the service.217 It is still unclear which “specific 
factors” national courts have to consider. Especially with respect to services such a criterion 
is not really useful because there will almost always be a cross-border element. The CJEU 
should thus come up with more detailed criteria in determining whether there is a sufficient 
cross-border element that provides a link with EU law. It is also preferable that the CJEU 
decline jurisdiction when it is unclear whether economic operators from other Member 
States were affected, as in Airport Shuttle Express and Venturini.218 
 
A stricter approach from the CJEU does not necessarily mean that the CJEU should 
immediately declare a request inadmissible (or decline jurisdiction) when a national court 
fails to indicate the connecting factors and/or specify the factual and (national) legal context 
of the case in detail. If the CJEU rejects questions of national courts, who made considerable 
investments in writing the reference, all too easily, this could offend them. The CJEU should 
thus carefully reason why a particular reference is not dealt with substantively.219 One 
solution in between would be that the CJEU makes better and more frequent use of Article 
101 of the Rules of Procedure. This provision enables the CJEU to request the referring 
national court to provide clarification on those factual and legal elements that are 
insufficiently substantiated. So far, the CJEU has been reluctant to make use of this 
possibility.220 A more frequent use of Article 101 by the CJEU would at the same time also 
have the additional benefit of transforming the preliminary ruling procedure into a dialogue 
and would also give the national court the idea that its questions are taken seriously, even 
when they are declared inadmissible. Currently, the referring court is no longer involved in 
the court proceedings after sending its reference to Luxembourg. Dutch judges refer to the 
                                            
217 See Tribuno Supremo, Case C-168/14, Grupo Itevelesa and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:685, para. 36, Judgment of 3 
June 2015.  
218 See ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 48, Judgment of 
13 Feb. 2014; ECJ, Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini, ECLI:EU:C:2013:791, para. 25–26, Judgment of 5 
December 2013; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 5, at para. 37. 
219 The CJEU did so in a relatively extensive judgment of 73 paragraphs in which it carefully explained why the 
questions were inadmissible. At the same time, the CJEU was willing to point to its previous judgments that would 
be helpful for the national court in resolving its questions. See ECJ, Case C-351/14, Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:447, Judgment of 16 June 2016. 
220 In the five-year period from September 13, 2011, to September 13, 2016, only twenty judgments of the CJEU 
were found where the CJEU used this possibility. Searched curia for “request for clarification” as well as “Article 
101,” “rules of procedure,” and “clarification.” One explanation for this reluctance could be that national procedural 
law might require the referring court to reopen the case at a national level in order to hear the parties. It is unclear 
whether this fear is justified. In one case, it took 1.5 months before the national court answered the request, in 
another only 1 month. See ECJ, Case C-347/12, Wiering, ECLI:EU:C:2014:300, para. 14, Judgment of 8 May 2014; 
ECJ, Case 351/14, Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez, ECLI:EU:C:2016:447, paras. 41–42 Judgment of 16 June 2016.  
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period leading up to the ruling of the CJEU as the “black hole” and some complain about the 
procedure as being a “one-way Q&A procedure.”221 A more assertive CJEU and more 
responsible national courts would also mean that the CJEU could focus on and save its 
resources for cases where its ruling is really necessary. 
                                            
221See Marc de Werd, Dynamics at Play in the EU Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 1, 
152 (2015).  
